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Abstract. Firstly, in this present paper, empirical evidence obtained after employing 
generalized least squares technique on the relevant sample data for Uganda over the 1970 
to 2016 period, shows that financialization had adverse effect on economic growth. 
Secondly, in Uganda during the sample period, deregulation (represented by exchange rate 
depreciation) enhanced financialization. Thirdly, financialization depressed investments in 
the country because a large fraction of investments could have been diverted away from 
the real sector to the financial sector. Fourthly, financialization had positive and significant 
effects on inflation, quantity of foreign exchange and balance of payments deficit. Lastly, 
empirical evidence indicates that financialization was as a result of increase in exchange 
rate and gold reserves, monetization of the economy, imports and movements in 
household disposable income relative to GDP. Results in the paper suggest the following 
recommendations: control of financialization through macro prudential financial 
regulation, reduction of balance of payments deficit, undertaking more investments in 
directly productive areas and control of the relative movements in disposable household 
consumption relative to GDP. 
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1. Introduction 
y using the GLS technique, this present paper examines the effects of 
political economy of financial regulation on financialization. In 
particular it looks into the effect of exchange rate depreciation (i.e. 
deregulation) on financialization and the effect of financialization on 
economic growth in Uganda during the period 1970 to 2016. Political 
economyrefers to how politics affect economic outcomes. The economy at 
all levels has always been subject to measures taken, or constraints imposed 
by political authorities. Several observers believe that the regulatory 
framework prevailing prior to the 2007–2008 global financial crisis was 
deficient because it was largely ‚microprudential‛ in nature (Borio, 2003; 
Borio et al., 2001; French et al., 2010; Goodhart et al., 2009; Hanson et al., 
2011; Kashyap et al., 2008; Saporta, 2009). 
A microprudential regulation approach aims at preventing the costly 
failure of individual financial institutions. In contrast, a ‚macroprudential‛ 
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approach seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole. After the 
2007–2008 global financial crisis, both academicians and policymakers seem 
to agree that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential 
direction (Hanson et al., 2011). In response this agreement, the paper tends 
to leanmore towards a macroprudential approach. In the paper, the review 
of literature covers the history of international political economy of 
financial regulation from 1944 to the present time, theoretical literature on 
political economy of financial regulation, empirical literature on financial 
regulation and economic growth, interaction between prudential policies 
and other financial sector policies, theory and empirics of financialization 
as an outcome of deregulation, and what political economy is.  
The motivation of the paper is that financialization could have been the 
driving force behind the economic depressions and financial crises for 
centuries. That is because the mathematical definition of financialization 
shows that the correlation between economic growth and financialization is 
negative. The idea that ‚correlation does not mean causation‛ makes the 
relationship between growth and financialization an interesting case for 
empirical examination within the context of political economy of financial 
regulation. Moreover, Battiston et al., (2016) provide some empirical 
evidence that excessive financialization depresses economic growth 
because it indicates that a larger fraction of credit is directed toward 
unfruitful investment projects, possibly generating economic crises. 
Firstly, in the paper regression results indicate that that financialization 
had adverse effect on economic growth in Uganda. Secondly, in Uganda 
during the sample period, deregulation (represented by exchange rate 
depreciation) enhanced financialization. Thirdly, financialization depressed 
investments in the country because a large fraction of investments could 
have been diverted away from the real sector to the financial sector. 
Fourthly, financialization had positive and significant effects on inflation, 
quantity of foreign exchange and balance of payments deficit. Lastly, 
empirical evidence indicates that financialization was as a result of increase 
in exchange rate and gold reserves, monetization of the economy, imports 
and movements in household disposable income relative to GDP. Results 
in the paper suggest the following recommendations: control of 
financialization through macroprudential financial regulation, reduction of 
balance of payments deficit, undertaking more investments in directly 
productive areas and control of the relative movements in disposable 
household consumption relative to GDP. 
 
2. Literature review 
This present section reviews literature that is relevant for the 
examination of ‚Financialization and Political Economy of Financial 
Regulation in Uganda.‛ Thus, it focuses on the relationships between 
financialization, economic growth and financial regulation at both national 
and international levels. The paper defines financialization as the ratio of 
money supply (M2) to GDP. The paper argues: (a) it is financializationthat 
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causes decline in economic growth and (b) financialization occurs as a 
result of financial deregulation and inappropriate financial regulation. 
Uganda is an interesting case to examine because since 1970 
financialization has been going on in the country at the expense of 
economic growth amidst deregulation. 
Economic growth is the foremost objective in all economies in the world. 
Consistent with such an objective towards growth and development, 
financial sector policies are also undertaken to enhance the broad objective 
of ensuring economic growth. However, there is no agreement on the 
relevance of financial sector in promoting growth. For instance, eminent 
economists, including Nobel laureates, have sharply disagreed on this 
issue.  
Thus, some economists and in particular Nobel laureate Merton Miller’s 
believe in the total irrelevance of finance and they consider the assertion 
that ‚financial markets contribute to economic growth‛ to be a proposition 
too obvious for serious discussion. Meanwhile, other economists reject the 
idea that the finance and growth theory can be safely ignored without 
substantially limiting our understanding of growth. 
Failure of regulation is widely accepted as one of the main causes of the 
crises. Therefore, reform of regulations, has become crucial for ensuring the 
smooth running of financial systems that is so vital for economic growth. 
The new regulations embodied in Basel III have more stringent 
requirements, particularly in terms of capital and liquidity. These rapidly 
evolving global standards have received support from all quarters, 
including developing countries. 
Therefore, for the regulatory reforms to be efficient without constraining 
future economic growth, policymakers are required to assess the effects of 
financial regulation on crucial drivers of economic growth e.g. trade 
finance, money supply and credit availability in various enterprises. 
Adaption of the regulations where necessary mitigates their negative 
effects on economic growth, and provides additional measures to promote 
economic growth. 
Regulation refers to some form of intervention in any activity involving 
among other things explicit legal control and informal peer group control 
by either government or an authoritative body (Ogus, 1994). There are two 
types of regulation: government regulation and self–regulation. Every 
government regulation is sometimes administered through government 
parastatals or agencies. 
 Government regulations are usually backed by statute laws established 
by acts of parliament or military decrees. Regulations are rules which are 
intended, in all stages of their application, to be interpreted and enforced 
by the courts. Effective laws usually prescribe punishments for non–
compliance. Thus, the power of statutes generally depends on willingness 
of society to obey the law and in the willingness of the state to enforce the 
punishment for non–compliance (Uche, 2001). 
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2.1. International financial regulation prior to the 1944 Bretton 
Woods conference 
On concluding World War I, most countries wanted to return to the old 
financial security and stable situation of pre WWI era as soon as possible. 
By 1926 discussions about a return to the gold standard began and all 
leading economies had re–establishedthe system, according to which every 
nation’s circulating money had to be backed by reserves of gold and 
foreign currencies to a certain extent. But several mistakes in implementing 
the gold standard were made ‚mainly that a weakened Great Britain had to 
take the leading part and that a number of main currencies were 
overvalued or undervalued‛(Dammasch, 2011). 
These mistakes led to the collapse of the economic and financial 
relations, culminating in the Great Depression in 1929. The major reason for 
this was that every single country tried to increase the competitiveness of 
its export products in order to reduce its balance of payment deficit by 
deflating its currency. Such a strategy only led to success as long as a 
country was deflating faster and more strongly than all other nations. In 
fact the strategy caused an international deflation competition that caused 
mass unemployment, bankruptcy of enterprises, the failing of credit 
institutions, as well as hyper inflations in the countries concerned 
(Dammasch, 2011). 
 
2.2. The origin of international financial regulation 
In 1941, the Allies decided to bring about the fullest collaboration 
between all nations in the economic field with the objective of improving 
labor standards, economic advancement and social security (Roosevelt & 
Churchill, 1941). This new international economic regulation system 
became a multilateral alternative to the chaotic economic competition of the 
1930s characterized by competitive currency depreciation, excessive tariff 
barriers, uneconomic barter deals, multiple currency practices and 
unnecessary exchange restrictions (Gardner, 1956). These regulations, in 
particular the international financial (IFR) regulations were believed to 
have deepened the Great Depression and ultimately contributed to the 
Second World War (Keynes, 1942, 1943). Therefore, there was need ‚to 
recreate a liberal world economy in which stable exchange rates and free 
trade were the norm‛ (Skidelsky, 2005; Verdier, 2013). 
The gold standard that had disintegrated in the 1930s was replaced by a 
new international monetary system in 1944. This new international 
monetary system became the cornerstone of the postwar economic order 
(Milner & Helleiner, 1995). A stable monetary system was expected to 
provide the foundation for reviving international trade by abolishing 
discriminatory preferences and reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade. 
The new system was envisioned to offer a highly legalized regime based on 
formal treaty obligations and intergovernmental organizations as well as 
balanced multilateral obligations with domestic economic and social policy 
autonomy (Ruggie, 2017). The IMF Articles of Agreement, established an 
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elaborate code of conduct for international monetary relations (Lowenfeld, 
2008; Verdier, 2013).  
The Articles created a system of fixed exchange rates. Under this system 
all currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar, and at the same time the 
dollar itself was pegged to gold at a rate of $35 per ounce. First, the IMF 
member states agreed to adopt and maintain a fixed ‚par value‛ for their 
currency. Thus, they expressed their individual domestic currencies in gold 
or dollars, and not change it unless necessary to correct a ‚fundamental 
disequilibrium‛ (Lowenfeld, 2008, p.623). Therefore, they accepted to fulfill 
this obligation, by intervening in the foreign exchange market through 
buying or selling their own currency near par value. Second, the article 
allows private persons to freely exchange their currency for current account 
transactions, such as international sales of goods and services (Garber, 
1993; Verdier, 2013). 
The article further allowed for maintaining the convertibility of the 
domestic currency, at least for current transactions, and was seen as 
essential to reviving international trade. Finally, under this system, a 
country that is facing a current account deficit was allowed to run out of 
foreign currency reserves needed to maintain its currency at par value. To 
address this problem, all members were expected to contribute to a fund 
administered by the IMF and available for lending to deficit countries, on 
the condition that they took steps to restore the balance of payment 
equilibrium. More importantly, the IMF Articles of Agreement allowed and 
encouraged capital controls, but they prohibited restrictions on current 
transactions (Garber, 1993; Verdier, 2013). 
Meanwhile, the Bretton Woods system ‚strongly encouraged closed 
national financial markets, with limited capital flows, and open markets for 
trade in goods.‛ The international capital flows were needed for 
reconstruction and development, and they were expected to occur 
primarily through official channels, not private investment (Arner, & 
Buckley, 2010; Garber, 1993; Verdier, 2013). 
 
2.3. International financial regulation, 1958–1968  
The Bretton Woods system was established by the 1944 Articles of 
Agreement to design a new international monetary order for the post war 
at a global conference organized by the US Treasury at the Mount 
Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire at the height of 
World War II. The Bretton Woods system was established to avoid 
protectionism, the perceived problems of the interwar period. 
Protectionism involved devolution of international trade from 
multilateralism to bilateralism and autarky, beggar thy neighbor 
devaluations ‚currency wars‛, hot money flows and unstable exchange 
rates (Taylor, 2015), and to provide a framework of monetary and financial 
stability to foster global economic growth and the growth of international 
trade (Bordo, 2017). 
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Due to a number of overwhelming obstacles, it took about fifteen years 
to get the Bretton Woods system (BWS) fully operational. Most countries 
operated their international trade through bilateralism except the United 
States. Meanwhile, there were pervasive exchange controls on international 
trade and every country negotiated a series of bilateral agreements with 
each of the trading partners. Due to a shortage of international reserves 
countries used exchange controls and bilateralism. Dollar shortage was the 
second problem facing the BWS. 
By the end of World War II while dollar reserves were depleted in the 
rest of the world, the US held two thirds of the world’s monetary gold 
stock and gold. In particular at the end of 1946 amidst dollar shortage the 
major European industrial countries set overvalued official parities. 
Meanwhile, the IMF pressured its members to declare par values as soon as 
possible and if the exchange rate chosen was inappropriate, it could be 
corrected later (Bordo, 2017; Triffin, 1957). Between 1948 and 1952 the 
Marshall Plan attracted approximately $13 billion in grants and loans to 
Western Europe. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, created the 
Marshall Plan. 
This act was designed to help the European countries expand their 
economies, restore their export capacity, and, preserve political stability by 
creating economic stability. The need to simplify bilateral clearing and pave 
the way to multilateralism gave rise to the establishment of the European 
Payments Union (EPU) in 1952 under the auspices of the OEEC 
(Organization of European Economic Cooperation) (Milward et al., 1990). 
The EPU worked under the basic principle of a commercial bank clearing 
house. Thus, at the end of every month, each member would clear its net 
debit or credit position against all of its members with the EPU, with the 
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) acting as its agent. Consequently, 
The EPU became the center of a worldwide multilateral settlement area. 
The process of multilateralism continued until eight European countries 
declared their currencies convertible for current account transactions on 
December 27, 1958 (Bordo, 2017; Garber, 1993, p.431). 
Third, the IMF, by intention, was not well equipped to deal with the 
postwar reconstruction problems. Almost all the structural balance of 
payments assistance in this period was provided by the Marshall Plan and 
other U.S. aid including the Anglo–American loan of 1945. Somehow the 
U.S. replaced the IMF. So new institutions such as the OEEC and existing 
institutions such as the BIS emerged as competing sources of international 
monetary authority because the Fund did very little to speed up the process 
of achieving multilateralism. Thus, the Fund’s image got severely impaired 
by three events during the pre–convertibility period (Mundell, 1969a; 
Bordo, 2017). 
The first event happened when France devalued the franc in 1948 and 
created a multiple exchange rate system and violated Article IV, section 5 
of the Articles. As a result France was then denied access to the Fund’s 
resources until 1952. But the Fund’s actions had little effect since France 
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had access to Marshall Plan aid. The second event that occurred was the 
sterling devaluation of September 1949. In this event the Fund was given 
only twenty four hours advance notice which also violated Article IV 
section 5.  
Thus exposing the Fund’s inability to deter a major power from 
following its sovereign interest. Third event occurred when Canada floated 
its currency in 1950, thus violating the Articles. Consequently, Canada did 
not return to the par value system until 1961 and in contrast to the Fund’s 
warnings. Meanwhile Canada freely floated its currency leading to only 
limited swings, thus making the Canadian economy perform better than it 
did when it was part of the par value system (Bordo et al., 2010; Bordo, 
2017). 
Fourth, the Fund’s system was unable to solve emerging perceived 
liquidity problems of the 1960s due to inadequate resources e.g. 
international reserves required to finance the growth of real output and 
trade and avoid deflation. The difference between the growth of 
international reserves and the growth in the world’s monetary gold stock 
was met largely by an increase in the official holdings of U.S. dollars 
resulting from U.S. balance of payments deficits (Mundell, 1969, p.481) 
The final event regarding the Bretton Woods system was the decline of 
sterling as a reserve currency. Right from the start it was expected that 
sterling would play an important role in the postwar period. When World 
War II came to an end, Britain had a massive balance of payments deficit in 
gold and dollars. Thus, Britain had an outstanding sterling debt of 3.7 
billion poundsamassed by borrowing from the British Empire, most of 
which was made inconvertible into dollars (Bordo, 2017). The 1946 Anglo 
American loan of $3.75 billion from the U.S. and $1.25 billion from Canada 
enabled Britain to ratify the Bretton Woods Articles and restore current 
account convertibility in dollars.  
On July 15, 1947 Britain’s Current account convertibility was restored 
and quickly followed by a run on sterling, thus leading to rapid depletion 
of the UK’s reserves as well as the suspension of convertibility on August 
20, 1947. Consequently, the depletion of reserves and the devaluation of 
sterling in 1949 greatly weakened sterling’s credibility as a reserve 
currency. The devaluation of 1949 was important for the system because it 
and Marshall Plan aid (by both boosting trade liberalization and removing 
political uncertainty) helped move key European countries from a current 
account deficit to a surplus which was important for the eventual 
restoration of convertibility. It was also important because it revealed a 
basic weakness with the adjustable peg arrangement and speculation 
against parity (Bordo, 2017; Friedman, 1953). 
 
2.4. International financial regulation, 1968 to 1971 
Starting from 1965 inflation became the key factor that led to the 
breakdown of the BWS in the center country, the United States. Beginning 
in 1965 inflationary policy continued until the early 1980s. Meanwhile, in 
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the 1970s this policy was known as the Great Inflation. The shift in policy 
reflected the accommodation of growing fiscal deficits; a strategy referred 
to as fiscal dominance (Leeper & Walker, 2011). The Vietnam War was the 
major driving force behind the rising expense and deficits. The fiscal 
pressure led to accommodative monetary policy through the ‚Even Keel‛ 
policies that the Federal Reserve was using to stabilize interest rates during 
Treasury funding operations. This operation hampered the Fed capacity to 
tighten monetary policy and offset inflationary pressure (Meltzer, 2011; 
Williamson, 2015). 
On devaluing sterling in November 1967 pressure mounted against the 
dollar via the London gold market. As a result from December 1967 to 
March 1968, the Gold Pool lost $3 billion in gold with the U.S. share at $2.2 
billion (Bordo et al., 2019; Solomon, 1976). Due to such pressure the Gold 
Pool was disbanded on March 17, 1968 and a two-tier arrangement put in 
its place. The monetary authorities of the Gold Pool agreed neither to sell 
nor to buy gold from the market and would transact amongst themselves at 
the official $35 price. In the following three years the U.S. put considerable 
pressure on other monetary authorities to refrain from converting their 
dollar holdings into gold (Bordo, 2017).  
Meanwhile the period 1968–1969 was characterized by currency crises in 
France and Germany leading to devaluation in France and a temporary 
float and then revaluation in Germany taking the pressure temporarily off 
the U.S.  In 1970 U.S. interest rates fell in response to rapid monetary 
expansion and the U.S. balance of payments mushroomed to $9 billion. The 
deficit exploded to $30 billion by August 1971. The dollar flood increased 
the reserves of the surplus countries during and caused inflation. German 
money growth doubled from 6.8 % to 12% in 1971 and the German inflation 
rate increased from 1.8% in 1969 to 5.3% in 1971 (Meltzer, 1991, p.73). In 
April 1971 the dollar inflow to Germany reached $3 billion. On May 5 1971 
the Bundesbank suspended official operations in the foreign exchange 
market and allowed the deutsche mark to float. Similar actions by Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland followed (Bordo, 2017; 
Solomon, 1976). 
In April 1971, the U.S. balance of trade turned to a deficit for the first 
time. The decision to suspend gold convertibility by President Richard 
Nixon on August 15 1971 was triggered by French and British intentions in 
early August to convert dollars into gold. The U.S. decision to suspend 
gold convertibility ended a key aspect of the Bretton Woods System. The 
remaining part of the system, the adjustable peg was abandoned by March 
1973. The Bretton Woods system collapsed for three basic reasons. First, the 
inflationary US monetary policy was inappropriate for the key currency of 
the system. Thus, the inflationary pressure from 1965 to 1971 was strong 
enough to trigger a speculative attack on the world’s monetary gold stock 
in 1968, leading to the collapse of the Gold Pool (Garber, 1993, p.461-485). 
Once the system had evolved into a de facto dollar standard after the 
collapse of the Gold Pool, the obligation of the United States was to 
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maintain price stability. Instead it conducted an inflationary monetary 
policy that ultimately destroyed the system. Indeed the Bretton Woods 
System was based on rules in particular monetary and fiscal policies 
consistent with the official peg. But the U.S. violated this rule after 1965 
(Bordo, 2017,p.84; Garber, 1993). 
Second, the surplus countries were increasingly unwilling to adjust and 
absorb dollar balances and revalue their currencies. This reflected basic 
differences in the underlying inflation rates that they were willing to 
accept. The growing gap between the sovereign interests of the United 
States and the other major powers reflected the decline in U.S. power. At 
the same time as U.S. power declined relative to the continental countries 
European countries and Japan the G10 lost effectiveness and no other focal 
points of power emerged. Last, the collapse of the Bretton Woods System 
involved two major design flaws: (a) the gold dollar/gold exchange system 
which placed the United States under threat of a convertibility crisis; and 
(b) the adjustable peg (Bordo, 2017).  
 
2.5. International financial regulation after 1971 
During the Bretton Woods monetary system, the first problem BWS 
faced was the distinction between capital and current transactions that was 
difficult to implement and that caused significant ‚leakage‛ and 
compromised the effectiveness of capital controls (Milner & Helleiner, 1995, 
p.44-48). The second difficulty was an extensive market developed for 
deposits and loans of U.S. dollars held outside the United States, the so 
called ‚Eurodollars.‛ The Eurodollar market increasingly circumvented 
attempts to control capital movements, as well as U.S. domestic regulation 
of reserve requirements (Clendenning, 1970, p.162-168; Frieden, 1987, p.68-
71; McCracken & Dam, 1983, p.99-100). The third problem was the 
persistent U.S. current account deficits that led to massive accumulation of 
U.S. dollars abroad. Ultimately this problem destroyed the fixed exchange 
rate system that had functioned as planned until the late 1960s (Lowenfeld, 
2008, p.624; Verdier, 2013). 
The dollar holdings eventually exceeded U.S. gold reserves, thus 
triggering a crisis of confidence. As a result the U.S. gold reserves 
plummeted because the foreign central banks requested redemption of 
their dollar holdings. Consequently, in 1971 President Nixon abolished the 
gold convertibility of U.S. dollars (Nixon, 1971). By 1973, after all the major 
industrialized countries had abandoned the fixed rate system, several 
attempts to reestablish it failed (Lowenfeld, 2008, p.624-33). From 1973 
onwards the IMF member states were free to choose their exchange rate 
regime and were free to change it at any time they wanted (IMF, 1945). 
Meanwhile, floating rates alleviated the need for capital controls to protect 
foreign exchange reserves (Obstfeld, 2002, p.125-132). During the 1970s and 
1980s period, virtually all industrialized countries abolished fixed exchange 
rates, and later encouraged others to follow suit (Milner & Helleiner, 1995; 
Verdier, 2013). 
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The collapse of the fixed rate system gave rise to financial globalization. 
Since then a clear, long term trend of increasing international capital flows 
has persisted. The floating exchange rate regime created an enormous 
foreign exchange market that grew from a negligible amount in the late 
1950s (Milner & Helleiner, 1995) to a daily turnover of about $4 trillion in 
2010 (Bank for International Settlements, 2010); only a small fraction of it 
was for trade (Milner & Helleiner, 1995).  
Greater foreign exchange and interest rate volatility drove the 
development of global derivatives markets. Foreign exchange and interest 
rate derivatives still dominated these markets, with $523 trillion out of the 
$601 trillion national amount outstanding in 2010-up from $68 trillion in 
1998, the first year for which Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
statistics were available (Bank of International Settlements, 2000, 2010, 
2011). 
In the 1970s the Eurodollar market grew exponentially and was 
composed of large deposits of dollars from oil exporters (often lent on to 
Latin America) (Frieden, 1987, pp.68–71). Meanwhile, between 1960 and 
1977, the international activities of banks increased rapidly from less than 
ten U.S. banks branches overseas, with assets of less than $4 billion in 1960; 
to more than 100, with assets of $230 billion in 1977 (Woolcock et al., 2001). 
On the other hand, the external assets of banks from forty one BIS reporting 
countries further rose from $687 billion in 1977 to $30.1 trillion in 2010 (BIS, 
1977, 2011).  
By 2013 debt and equity markets had also become global. International 
debt securities outstanding grew from $896 billion in March 1987 to $27.7 
trillion in 2010; international equity issues for BIS reporting countries went 
from $1.7 billion in 1983 to $708 billion in 2010 (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2010). Altogether, the size of financial markets relative to the 
world economy has increased steadily (Stulz, 2005). Thus, in 2007 the 
global financial assets amounted to 343% of the world’s GDP (Lund & 
Roxburgh, 2009, pp.8–9). 
 
2.6. Global financial regulation since 1980 
Financial globalization has been growing since 1980. Cross border 
capital flows grew from US$0.5 trillion in 1980 to a peak of US$11.8 trillion 
in 2007 (Lund & Roxburgh, 2009). Financial globalization has been 
generated mainly by cross border banks, especially in developing countries 
(Claessens, 2017). Thirty banks have now been identified as systemically 
important on a global level (G–SIBs) and they are important nodes of global 
finance. The collapse of any of these banks would have significant 
repercussions on financial markets, governments and citizens in many 
countries (Jones & Knaack, 2016). 
When the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors was created forty 
years ago, it was possible to divide the world of global finance into two 
distinct groups of countries. The first group was the relatively small core 
group of countries housing major financial centers such as New York, 
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London, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Frankfurt. The second group was 
composed of many more peripheral countries with much smaller financial 
sectors. The financial systems of the core countries were tightly 
interconnected. Past links between the financial systems of core countries 
and the rest of the world were nowhere near as they are today. Although a 
relatively small number of countries still accounts for the bulk of the global 
finance (Bank for International Settlements, 2016; IMF, 2017), three 
important shifts have emerged (Jones & Knaack, 2016). 
First, the financial sectors of the world’s largest and fastest–growing 
developing countries are so important that they are now part of the core. 
Foreign banks were overwhelmingly headquartered in OECD countries in 
the 1990s in the past decade. But in the recent past the world has 
experienced the cross–border expansion of banks headquartered in 
developing countries. For instance, China is the home jurisdiction to 4 of 
the 10 largest banks on earth, with operations in over 40 countries 
(Alexander, 2011). Meanwhile, emerging market economies account for a 
12% share of the global shadow banking sector (Jones & Knaack, 2016; 
Sfadia et al., 2014). 
Second, developing countries are far more interconnected to the 
financial core and to each more than 40 years ago. Privatization and 
liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, caused the presence of foreign banks 
presence to increase and by 2007 they accounted for more than half of the 
market share in 63 developing countries. Developing countries now have a 
higher level of foreign bank presence than industrialized countries. 
This makes the developing counties particularly vulnerable to financial 
crises and regulatory changes in other jurisdictions. This dramatic 
interconnectedness was more powerful during the 2007–2008 global 
financial crisis, than in the previous crises. However, the crisis affected all 
types of countries around the world (Claessens, 2017). The majority of 
foreign banks remain headquartered in North America and Western 
Europe. Meanwhile, banks from emerging markets and developing 
countries are playing an increasingly important role, accounting for 26% of 
foreign banks in 2007. In Sub–Saharan Africa for instance, pan–African 
banks are now operating in 36 countries and play a more important role on 
the continent than long–established European and US banks (Jones & 
Knaack, 2016; Mecagni et al., 2015). 
Third, OECD countries have lost their monopoly as the only hub of 
financial innovation. Disruptive technologies especially in the retail 
financial sector, are being invented in developing countries. Consumers in 
OECD countries still rely on credit and debit cards as their primary 
payment platform. Meanwhile, consumers in China use their cell phones 
for a wide range of quotidian payments and even investment services. By 
2016 China’s AliPay digital payment service had 450 million users, several 
times the amount of PayPal worldwide. In 2015, AliPay reached a peak 
processing volume of 85.900 transactions per second, compared to 14.000 
transactions per second for Visa. Meanwhile, the largest American peer–to–
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peer lending company, Lending Club, issued around $16bn in loans over 
the last five years. This amount is meagre when compared to over $100bn 
in loans issued by its Chinese equivalent Ant Financial in the same period 
(Chen, 2016; Jones & Knaack, 2017).  
 
2.7. Theoretical literature on the political economy of financial 
regulation 
Wittman (1977) advances the normative theory of financial regulation. 
The normative theory of regulation states that regulators should encourage 
healthy competition where practicable and minimize the costs of 
information asymmetry by obtaining information and thereafter providing 
operators with needful incentives to improve their business performance. 
This theory suggests that financial regulators can further provide a viable 
price structure that may improve economic efficiency and establish 
regulatory systems that are in tune with transparency, predictability, 
legitimacy, and credibility of such a regulatory process.  
The normative theory of regulation ensures a cost–benefit analysis of 
various regulatory instruments employed by monetary authorities 
(Igbinosa et al., 2017). Generally, reforms (i.e. regulations) have emerged in 
response to the challenges occurring in the financial systems worldwide 
such as systemic crisis as well as globalization, technological innovations 
and the global financial crisis. The financial sector is composed of the 
banking sector, capital markets and non–bank financial institutions. The 
financial sector in any industry aim s at increasing monetary management, 
risk management and asset holding capacities of the corporate institutions. 
Thus reforms (i.e. regulations) often seek to proactively strengthen the 
financial system, prevent systemic crisis, strengthen market mechanisms 
and instill ethical standards (Igbinosa et al., 2017; Omankhanlen, 2012). 
Battiston et al., (2016) believes that traditional economic theory cannot 
explain or predict, the near collapse of the financial system and its long-
lasting effects on the global economy. The occurrence of 2008 crisis has 
increasing generated interest in using ideas from complexity theory to 
make sense of economic and financial markets. The actual use of 
complexity models and results remains at an early stage even though 
concepts, such as tipping points, networks, contagion, feedback, and 
resilience have entered the financial and regulatory arena.  
The liberal approach to economics was first began by Smith (1904). His 
central theorem rests upon three main factors as the key to wealth and 
prosperity: (a) Freedom, where individuals have the right to produce and 
exchange, products, labor and capital as they wish; (b) Competition, where 
individuals have the right to compete in the production and exchange of 
goods and services; and (c) Justice, where the actions of individuals must 
be just and honest according to the rules of society. These three factors 
would lead to a natural harmony of interest between workers, landlords 
and capitalists, without the need for state intervention. Smith (1904) calls 
this natural harmony the invisible hand (Ramanathan & Teng, 2017). 
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Neo Classical economists believe that a capitalist market economy could 
deviate from its equilibrium (in terms of level of output and employment). 
But the deviation is accepted as a temporary phenomenon since markets 
would eventually be able to restore the equilibrium. The Neo Classical 
Economists argue that government intervention is neither necessary nor 
desirable since it would likely create instability. Thus, both Classical and 
Neo Classical economists believe that the invisible hand can stabilize the 
markets. But that belief was challenged during the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) of 2008 (Ramanathan & Teng, 2017). 
During the post GFC 2008 era Keynesian economics gained prominence 
due to the fact that market economies became inherently unstable, thus 
resulting in fluctuations in aggregate output and employment. Advocates 
of Keynesian economics were aware of the need for discretionary monetary 
and fiscal policies (Modigliani et al., 1977; Tobin, 1996). Since that time 
Keynes (1939) advanced ‚The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money‛ the role of the state in macro-economic policy, has been evolving. 
For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, economists believed in the capacity of 
governments to correct market failure. However, in the 1970s and 1980s the 
government’s role in restoring equilibrium in the market became doubtful. 
Thus, there was a gradual shift towards the belief that the market itself 
could restore equilibrium. Belief in free markets reached its peak during the 
1990s and 2000s until the GFC in 2008 erupted (Ramanathan & Teng, 2017). 
 
2.8. Empirical literature on financial regulation and economic 
growth 
Empirically evidence has strongly established the effect of financial 
systems on growth. Due to difficulties in directly measuring efficiency in 
the financial sector, a large number of empirical studies have relied on 
measures of size or structure to provide evidence of a link between 
financial system development and economic growth (Levine, 2005). 
Meanwhile, nearly all studies based on macro or sector level data find that 
financial development, measured as the size of financial intermediation or 
of external finance relative to GDP, has a significant positive effect on 
growth.  
This effect is either direct via productivity, or indirect via its effect on the 
buildup of physical and knowledge capital (Pelgrin, Schich, & Serres, 2002). 
Generally, findings show that even though the majority of these studies 
cover a broad range of developed and developing countries, the results of 
financial development affecting growth have been found to hold. Also the 
sample is limited to OECD countries (Leahy et al., 2001; Pelgrin, Schich, & 
Serres, 2002). 
Mwega (2014) investigates the potential tradeoffs between regulations 
and stability of Kenya’s financial sector and their implications for inclusive 
growth in the following areas: (i) size and growth of the financial sector 
relative to LICs and MICs; (ii) implications of a mixture of local banks 
(some of which have spread to neighboring countries), foreign banks and 
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development finance institutions; (iii) evolution and macroeconomic 
implications of financial innovations and inclusion; (iv) cost and access to 
credit, especially to SMEs; (e) prudential regulations; and (f) management 
of capital flows in the context of large current account deficits, mainly 
financed by short-term net capital inflows such that their easy reversibility 
could potentially generate a currency crisis. 
Mwega (2014) among other things concludes that: (1) the financial sector 
is one of the drivers of growth in Kenya, at least in the short-run. On an 
annual basis, the financial sector growth has consistently outpaced the real 
GDP growth since 2009. (2) The high current account deficit has mainly 
been financed by short term net capital inflows. These capital inflows have 
typically accounted for more than 50% of total financial flows. The easy 
reversibility of these inflows increases the risk of a ‚sudden stop‛ as a shift 
in market sentiments creates a flight away from domestic assets (O`Connell 
et al., 2010). This could lead to depletion of reserves and sharp currency 
depreciations Mwega (2014). 
Igbinosa et al. (2017) use error correction model (ECM) and time series 
data for the period 1993 to 2014 to examine financial regulation and 
banking sector performance in Nigeria. They attempt to determine the 
impact of reforms on banking sector performance as well as assess the 
connection between capital adequacy and banking sector performance. 
Their empirical findings indicate that during the sample period financial 
regulation significantly affected the banking sector performance while 
financial regulation had both short run and long run dynamic relationships 
with the banking sector performance in Nigeria. They conclude that during 
the sample period capital adequacy negatively affected banking sector 
performance but was not statistically significant.  
Sløk et al. (2007) perform output and productivity regressions on a 
sample of around 25 countries and industries by entering 16 countries in 
each regression and a similar number of industries having a time series 
dimension. Their results indicate that financial system regulation has a 
statistically significant influence on output and productivity growth, in 
particular via the impact on industrial sectors relying more heavily on 
external sources of funding. The economic impact is also found to be non–
negligible. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that reforms that would 
align regulations in banking in countries with the most restrictive stance to 
the OECD average could be associated with an increase in annual GDP 
growth ranging from ¼% to ½% for a significant period of time.  
 
2.9. Theory and empirics of financialization as an outcome of 
deregulation 
The term ‚financialization‛ began in the 1970s and it has been widely 
used to describe changes in the financial markets over the period of 
deregulation. Financialization refers to the process by which the volume 
and significance of financial instruments and contracts has grown relative 
to the economy (in particular real output) as a whole.Financialization may 
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better be defined as ‚The increase in financial market activity that does not 
improve, and may impair the efficiency of capital intermediation (i.e. net 
cost to the economy) by the financial sector.‛ (Turbeville, 2013).  
According to Levine (2005) most economists were already persuaded, by 
a voluminous empirical literature to believe that with ample qualification 
and due caution, finance and financial markets do contribute to economic 
growth. Nobel Laureate financial economist Miller (1998: 14) finds the 
proposition that financial markets enhance economic growth to be ‚almost 
too obvious for serious discussion.‛   
But Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2017) argue that greater financialization is to 
be integral to both ‘growth’ and ‘inclusive growth’, and they conclude that 
‘financial inclusion allows people to make many everyday financial 
transactions more efficiently and safely and expand their investment and 
financial risk management options by using the formal financial system. To 
them this is especially relevant for people living in the poorest 40 percent of 
households (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2017). Similarly, Shiller (2013) argues 
that to extend the good life to more people requires not to shrink finance 
nor restrain financial innovation (Storm, 2018). 
However, financialization underwrites neoliberal narratives and 
discourses which emphasize individual responsibility, risk taking and 
active investment for the benefit of the individual alone within the ‘neutral’ 
or even ‘natural’ constraints imposed by financial markets and financial 
norms of creditworthiness (Kear, 2013; Palma, 2009). With time, 
financialization turns into a ‘technique of power’ to maintain a particular 
social order (Palma, 2009; Saith, 2011), in which the delicate task of 
balancing competing social claims and distributive outcomes is offloaded 
to the ‘invisible hand’ operating via anonymous, ‘blind’ financial markets 
(Krippner, 2011; Krippner, 2005; Storm, 2018). During the social regulation 
regime, income and wealth becomes more concentrated in the hands of the 
rentier class (Goda et al., 2017; Saith, 2011). As a result, productive capital 
accumulation gives way before the increased speculative use of the 
‘economic surplus of society’ in pursuit of ‘financial-capital’ gains through 
asset speculation (Davis & Kim, 2015). Such an outcome removes the 
driving force of the ‘real’ economy, and firms react by holding back 
investment, using their profits to pay out dividends to their shareholders 
and to buy back their own shares (Lazonick, 2014). Because the rich own 
most financial assets, anything that causes the value of financial assets to 
rise rapidly makes the rich richer (Storm, 2018; Taylor et al., 2015). Battiston 
et al., (2018) provide empirical evidence on the patterns of increasing 
financialization in the EU in the last two decades. They analyze possible 
adverse effects of financialization on several objectives of the EU 2030 
agenda, including inclusive growth, innovation, inequality and financial 
stability.  
First, they find that excessive financialization depresses economic 
growth because it implies that a larger fraction of credit is directed toward 
unfruitful investment projects, possibly generating economic crises (e.g. via 
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housing price bubbles). Second, they find that financialization has negative 
impact on innovation because the separation between actors taking risks 
from innovation and actors extracting rents from innovation implies lower 
share of reinvested profits (e.g. via short-termism and share buybacks).  
Third, they find that financialization contributes to inequality by 
strengthening top earners bargaining power in terms of higher wages and 
lower taxation, as well as by burdening public budgets with fiscal 
assistance to financial institutions in time of crisis. Fourth, they find that 
financialization may lead to financial instability by increasing both the 
leverage of interconnected financial institutions and the risk of mispricing 
of large asset classes. For example the dynamics of leverage and mispricing 
of mortgage backed securities was mirrored in the 2008 financial crisis 
(Battiston et al., 2018). 
 
2.10. Interaction between prudential policies and other financial 
sector policies 
Financial stability is a necessary condition to achieve other objectives of 
financial sector policies as well as growth and macroeconomic stability. But 
it is not a sufficient condition for attaining these objectives. Meanwhile, 
prudential policies (Basel II, Basel II.5, Basel III and the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision) can deliver financial stability. As a result, 
these policies can facilitate growth and other objectives of financial sector 
policies (Sinha, 2011). 
Otherwise, other policies will have to be implemented to balance 
numerous considerations such as growth imperatives, the flow of credit to 
disadvantaged and preferred sectors, consumer protection, financial 
inclusion and equity, etc. At times, it becomes extremely problematic to 
balance these considerations. In case of inadequate care, other financial 
sector policies may impact financial stability negatively. For instance, 
allowing excessive credit growth to finance GDP growth without 
controlling the build-up of systemic risk in some areas of the economy may 
have serious consequences on financial stability. A loose monetary policy 
for an extended period may result in substantial financial sector imbalances 
and cause economic/financial crises (Sinha, 2011). 
Flawed financial regulation may cause rapid monetary growth and 
slowdown economic growth, increase the indebtedness of households, 
lower their standards of living, and destabilize the banking system wholly 
or party. Yet, flawed financial regulation may cause the subprime crisis, an 
attribute of a seriously flawed financial inclusion and consumer protection 
policy. Meanwhile, substantial dependence on a few large financial 
institutions for financial services may lead to moral hazard issues i.e. the 
‚too-big-to-fail‛ syndrome. Therefore, it is important that a set of sound 
financial sector policies (including prudential policies) be followed to 
deliver the various objectives for instance economic growth against the 
backdrop of financial stability (Sinha, 2011). 
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2.11. What is political economy? 
The paper examines the influence of financial regulation on 
financialization and economic growth within the context of political 
economy. Political economyrefers to how politics affect economic 
outcomes. This question comes about whenever people are interested in 
economics itself. By1848, the principles of political economy, what in fact 
we now call ‘‘economics’’ was generally referredto as ‘‘political economy’’ 
(Groenewegen, 2008, pp.904–907). As a terminology political economy to a 
great extent reflected thebelief that economics was not really separable 
from politics. Political economy arose from thewidespread view that 
political factors are crucial in determining economicoutcomes. As a 
discipline economics historically viewed political forces as influencing 
economic outcomes and determining political influence. The economy at all 
levels has always been subject to measures taken, or constraints imposed 
by political authorities (Vanberg, 2018). 
Economists abstracted from political and institutional factorswith the 
division of economics and political science into distinct disciplines. To a 
great extent motivations for this separation arose from the desire for 
methodological progress and for a more rigorous technique foreconomic 
analysis. As the neoclassical economics developedstress was on the 
principleof optimization by consumers and firms subject to well–defined 
constraints and a market environment, while deliberately downplaying 
more amorphous political factors. With the development of neoclassical 
economics; economic determinants not easily formalized were seen as 
largely belongingto otherdisciplines. However, economics was once called 
political economy, and economics is the social science that deals with the 
production, distribution, and consumption of material wealth and with 
thetheory and management of economic systems or economies (Serrat, 
2011). 
Interest in the question of how politics affects economic outcomes 
maythus appear new to someone trained solely in modern neoclassical 
economics; in fact, it is not. Of late, there really has been an explosion inthe 
number of papers looking at the effect of politics on economicoutcomes. 
Leading journals are filled with articles on the political economy of various 
economic phenomena. In short, political economy falls into the special class 
of issues that seem quite old and musty and at the same time quite young 
andfresh. In brief, political economy investigates theinteraction of political 
and economic processes in a society (Serrat, 2011). 
The new political economy is not just a resurrection of anearlier 
approach to economics. It is characterized by a strong interestin the 
question of how politics affects economic outcomes. At the same time the 
newpolitical economy is defined more by its way of approaching this 
question. In particular it is defined in large part by its use of the formal and 
technicaltools of modern economic analysis to examine the importance of 
politics foreconomics. Thus modern economic analysis employs the formal 
mathematical approach. Meanwhile, it is also conceptual, viewing political 
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The motivation of the paper is that financialization could have been the 
driving force behind the economic depressions and financial crises for 
centuries. That is because the mathematical definition of financialization 
shows that the correlation between economic growth and financialization is 
a negative.  
The idea that ‚correlation does not mean causation‛ makes the 
relationship between growth and financialization an interesting case for 
empirical examination within the context of political economy of financial 
regulation. Moreover, Battiston et al., (2018) provide some empirical 
evidence that excessive financialization depresses economic growth 
because it implies that a larger fraction of credit is directed toward 
unfruitful investment projects, possibly generating economic crises.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
According to (Karwowski, Shabani, & Stockhammer, 2016) financial 
deregulation encourages financialization. Financialization is defined as the 
process whereby the financial sector (financial: markets, institutions and 
elites) rather than the real sector controls economic policy and economic 
outcomes. Financialization elevates the financial sector relative to the real 
sector (Haruna, 2012) and transfers income from the real sector to the 
financial sector (Palley, 2007).  
In other words financialization ( 𝐹) can be viewed as the ratio of the 
monetary sector (moneysupply 𝑀2 = 𝑀𝑛 ) relative to the real sector i.e. 
GDP(𝑌) and is given by 
 
𝐹 = 𝑀𝑛/𝑌.         (1) 
 
Thus transforming Equation (1) into logarithmic form provides 
 
log 𝑌 = log 𝑀𝑛 − log⁡(𝐹).       (2) 
 
Therefore, Equation (2) indicates a negative relationship between 
financialization and output. 
Tori & Onaran (2018) estimates the effects of financialization on physical 
investment in the UK using panel data based on balance sheets of publicly 
listed non–financialcompanies supplied by Worldscopefor the period 1985–
2013. They find robust evidence of an adverse effect of (a) financial 
payments(interests and dividends) and (b) financial incomes on the rate of 
accumulation. Their findings support the ‚financialization thesis‛ that the 
increasing orientation of the non-financial sectortowards financial activities 
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ultimately leads to lower physical investment, hence to stagnant or fragile 
growth.  
Thus the financialization thesis that financialization (  𝐹) has adverse 
effect on investment ( 𝐼) can be represented as given by Equations 3 and 4. 
 
𝐼 = 𝐹−𝛼 .         (3) 
or    
log 𝐼 = −𝛼log⁡(𝐹).        (4) 
 
In logarithm the national income model may be written as 
 
𝑌 = 𝑒𝑢𝐶𝑛
𝛽1𝐼𝛽2𝐺𝛽3𝑋𝛽4𝑀−𝛽5 .       (5) 
or  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌 = 𝛽1 log 𝐶𝑛 + 𝛽2 log 𝐼 + 𝛽3 log 𝐺 + 𝛽4 log 𝑋 − 𝛽5 log 𝑀 + log 𝑢 . (6) 
 
Where 𝛽1 ,𝛽2 , 𝛽3 ,𝛽4 ,−𝛽5 are all parameters, ( 𝐶𝑛 ) is household 
consumption, (𝐼)is investment,  (𝐺) is government spending,  (𝑋) is level of 
exports, (𝑀) is level of imports and (𝑢) is the disturbance term. 
Therefore, substituting Equation 4 in Equation 6 provides: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌 = 𝛽1 log 𝐶𝑛 − 𝛼𝛽2 log 𝐹 + 𝛽3 log 𝐺 + 𝛽4 log 𝑋 − 𝛽5 log 𝑀 +
log 𝑢 .          (7) 
 
Hence, Equation 3.6 implies that financialization has adverse effects on 
economic growth. 
 
3.2. Data sources and data types 
Data for Uganda covering the period 1970 to 2016 were collected from 
the World Bank on annual quantities of the following variables: gross 
domestic product  𝑌 , household consumption expenditure  𝐶𝑛 ,  
investment spending  𝐼 ,  government spending  𝐺 ,  exports  𝑋 ,   
imports 𝑀 ,  exchange rate  𝐸𝑅 , population size  𝑃𝑜 ,  general price level 
 𝑃 , money supply  𝑀𝑛 , and exchange rate and gold reserves  𝑅𝐴𝐺 . Out 
of the relevant variables and the respective estimators, annual quantities 
were estimated for these variables: household disposable income  𝑌𝑑 , 
quantity demanded of exchange rate  𝑄 ,balance of payments deficits  𝐵𝑑  
and financialization  𝐹 . 
 
3.3. Generalized least squares method 
The generalized least squares (GLS) method is an efficient estimation 
technique that can be used to estimate the parameters (𝛽 ) and variances 
[𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑇−1 ] for the model given by 
 
𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢         (8) 
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Where 𝑋 denotes a matrix of explanatory variables, 𝑦represents a vector 
for the independent variable and 𝑢is a vector of error terms. Thus pre–
multiplying Equation 7 by 𝑇−1 transforms this equation to a GLS equation 
given by 
 
𝑇−1𝑦 = 𝑇−1𝑋𝛽 + 𝑇−1𝑢       (9) 
 
Thus in matrix notation 𝛽 can be expressed as  
 
𝛽 𝐺𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋
′𝑇−1𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑇−1𝑦.       (10) 
 
Therefore in matrix notation (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽 𝐺𝐿𝑆)can be expressed as  
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽 𝐺𝐿𝑆) = (𝑋
′𝑇−1𝑋)−1.       (11) 
 
Where 𝑇 is symmetric idempotent positive definite. 
 
3.4. Econometric tests 
Relevant regressions were performed after making sure that time series 
data for each of the variables were stable. Some of the variables were made 
stable by dividing each of them by an appropriate numeraire. For each of 
the 13 regression results the coefficient of determination was very high 
mainly due to the application of the national income model in some 
regressions and generally the use of the GLS method. The 𝑡 tests conducted 
show that the coefficients of elasticity of each of the variables in the 
respective regression results was greater than the corresponding critical 𝑡 
value from the 𝑡  distribution table. Thus each of the variables in the 
regressions results had significant influence on the respective independent 
variables.  
The 𝐹 statistic for each of the 13 regression results indicates that the 
independent variables from each of the respective variables had joint effect 
on each of the respective independent variables. Thus, implying that each 
of the respective 𝐹 statistic appearing in the respective regression results 
was greater than the corresponding critical 𝐹 value from the 𝐹 table.  
The Durbin–Watson (𝐷𝑊) tests conducted indicate that each of the 13 
regressions was free from serial correlation. Finally, the test for 
heteroskedasticity, 𝐻𝑇 statistic for each of the 13 regressions was less than 
the critical 𝑡 value from the 𝑡 table. Implying that each of the 13 regressions 
reported was free from heteroskedasticity. Hence, results from the twelve 
regressions were found to be adequate for drawing reliable conclusions. 
 
4. Results and discussion of results 
Broad money (M2) or stock of liquid liabilities (M3) expressed as a ratio 
of GDP is a measure of importance of the financial sector or financial depth 
i.e. financialization (Fasianos et al., 2018). In the paper broad money (M2) is 
denoted by (Mn) i.e. money supply in nominal terms and is one of the 
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variables used in conducting empirical analysis. Results in Table 1 indicate 
that in Uganda during the 1972 to 2016 period, a 1% increase in 
financialization growth was responsible for 0.04% decline in economic 
growth per annum on average ceteris paribus. That is because 
financialization (a) elevates the importance of the financial sector relative to 
the real sector, (b) transfers income from the real sector to the financial 
sector, and (c) increases income inequality and generates wage stagnation 
(Palley, 2007). 
 
Table 1. Effect of Financialization on Economic Growth in Uganda   
Dependent Variable: (d(log(Y))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(log(Cn))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.53 5.11 
(d(log(F))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.4 -3.79 
(d(log(G))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.45 10.02 
(d(log(X))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.23 12.31 
d(log(M))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.27 -11.23 
R-squared: 0.99998 F-Statistic: 415236 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.99998 D.W. Statistic: 1.74 HT: 0.00      N: 43 
   
On comparing Tables 1 and 2, it can be discerned that financialization 
seems to have transferred resources from the household sector to the 
government and foreign sectors in Uganda. 
 
Table 2. Effect of Investment Spending on Economic Growth in Uganda 
Dependent Variable: (d(log(Y))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(log(Cn))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.682 8.69 
(d(log(I))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.4 -3.79 
(d(log(G))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2))  0.184     3.86 
(d(log(X))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.082  4.23 
(d(log(M))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.084 -2.89 
R-squared: 0.99999         F-Statistic: 755346 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.99999  D.W. Statistic: 2.18       HT: 0.00      N: 43 
 
Similarly, on comparing Tables 3 and 2, it can be deduced that 
financialization seems to have transferred resources from the directly 
productive sectors to the government and sector in Uganda during the 1972 
to 2016 period ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 3. Effect of Financialization on Economic Growth in Uganda 
Dependent Variable: (d(log(Y))/d(d(log(Yd/RAG))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(log(RAG))/d(d(log(Yd/RAG))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.30 4.18 
(d(log(F))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.03 -3.93 
(d(log(G))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2))  0.57 22.94 
(d(log(Bd))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.23 -17.63 
R-squared: 0.99994         F-Statistic: 205997 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.99993 D.W. Statistic: 1.8 HT: 0.02      N: 43 
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Comparison of Tables 1 and 4 shows clearly that one of the root causes 
of financialization is monetization. Thus the effect of monetization on 
economic growth seems to have been transmitted through financialization. 
That could be the reason why the influence on financialization on economic 
growth is exactly equal to the influence of monetization on economic 
growth in Uganda. Of course, during the 1972 to 2016 period a 1% increase 
in monetary growth or growth in financialization was associated with 
0.04% decrease in economic growth in the country ceteris paribus. The term 
monetization refers to conversion of an asset into cash for example ‚equity 
monetization refers to the conversion of an equity position(generally, 
common shares) into cash‛ (Hayward, 2003). 
 
Table 4. Effect of Monetization on Economic Growth in Uganda 
Dependent Variable: (d(log(Y))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(log(Cn))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.30 4.18 
(d(log(Mn))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.03 -3.93 
(d(log(X))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.57 22.94 
(d(log(M))/d(d(log(Y/Po))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.23 -17.63 
R-squared: 0.99999           F-Statistic: 381668 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.99999 D.W. Statistic: 1.77      HT: 0.00      N: 43 
 
The paper finds that deregulation estimated in terms of exchange rate 
depreciation had adverse effects on economic growth in Uganda during the 
1972 to 2016 period. That is because according to results in Table 5 a 1% rise 
in exchange rate depreciation translates into a decline of 0.03% in economic 
growth per annum on average ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 5. Effect of Financialization on Economic Growth in Uganda  
Dependent Variable: (d(log(Y))/d(d(log(Y/ER))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(log(Cn))/d(d(log(Y/ER))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.46 8.30 
(d(log(ER))/d(d(log(Y/ER))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.03 -8.39 
(d(log(G))/d(d(log(Y/ER))))/d(d(𝑌2)  0.52 17.17 
(d(log(X))/d(d(log(Y/ER))))/d(d(𝑌2)) 0.24 25.40 
(d(log(M))/d(d(log(Y/ER))))/d(d(𝑌2)) -0.22 -12.89 
R-squared: 0.99997           F-Statistic: 323023 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.99997 D.W. Statistic: 2.01       HT: 0.00      N: 43 
 
In the paper attempts are made to estimate annual quantities of foreign 
exchange by making use of results in Table 6. The exchange rate elasticity 
coefficient of money supply is used to generate the annual quantities of 
exchange rate available in the domestic market by using the estimator 
(formula) 𝑄 = 𝑀𝑛/𝐸𝑅
0.958992 .  The implication of this finding is that 
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Table 6. Measurement of Exchange Rate Elasticity of Money Supply 
Dependent Variable: (d(d(log(Mn)))/d(d(log(M/RAG))))/d(d(𝑀𝑛2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(d(log(ER)))/d(d(log(M/RAG))))/d(d(𝑀𝑛2)) 0.95 899233.78 
 R-squared: 0.96 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.96 D.W. Statistic: 2.14       HT: 0.02      N: 45 
 
 Results in Table 7 indicate that a 1% increase in financialization 
gave rise to 2.20% increase in the amount of foreign exchange rate in the 
domestic market during the 1972 to 2016 period in Uganda ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 7. Effect of Financialization on of Quantity of Exchange Rate in Uganda 
Dependent Variable: log(Q)/d(d(𝑄2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
log(F)/d(d(𝑄2)) 2.198                18.60 
 R-squared: 0.88 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.88 D.W. Statistic: 2.04       HT: 0.06      N: 45 
  
According to Thomson & Dutta (2015, p.9), free capital movements 
across countries (i.e., financial deregulation) have caused dramatic 
exchange rates volatility. For example in the 2000s, capital flows movement 
was from developing economies, instead of the other way round. That 
could have been the reason why at the beginning of 2008, the IMF changed 
to the option of accepting capital controls (i.e. financial regulation).Thus for 
the case of Uganda capital outflows denoted by minus log(Q) could have 
resulted in exchange rate depreciation during the 1975 to 2016 period. 
Meanwhile, as portrayed by Table 8, a 1% increase in financialization was 
associated with on average 0.62% increase per annum in exchange rate 
depreciation during the sample period, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 8. Effect of Financialization on Exchange Rate Depreciation in Uganda 
Dependent Variable: (d(log(ER))/d(Y))/d(d(𝐸𝑅2)) 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(log(Q))/d(Y))/d(d(𝐸𝑅2)) -1.0619 -811.52 
(d(log(F))/d(Y))/d(d(𝐸𝑅2)) 0.6223 114.30 
(d(log(G))/d(Y))/d(d(𝐸𝑅2)) 2.1542 129.33 
(d(log(X))/d(Y))/d(d(𝐸𝑅2)) 0.6186 148.71 
(d(log(M))/d(Y))/d(d(𝐸𝑅2)) -2.8307 -93.80 
R-squared: 0.999993         F-Statistic: 1310333         Sample Period: 1975-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.999992 D.W. Statistic: 2.07      HT: 0.00      N: 41 
  
From Table 9, it can be discerned that increase in growth of movement 
in household disposable income relative to GDP resulted into 
unprecedented yearly increase in financialization in Uganda during the 
1975 to 2016 period, ceteris paribus. Of course a 1% increase in growth of 
movement in household disposable income relative to GDP resulted into 
approximately 283% increase in financialization in the country during the 
sample period, ceteris paribus. The main reason for this movement could 
have been increase in access of households to credit followed by 
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consumption boom arising from financialization as it was in the US during 
the 1990s (Stockhammer, 2012). 
 
Table 9. Effects of Exchange Rate and Gold Reserves, Quantity of Exchange Rate 
andMovements of Household Disposable Income Relative to GDP on Financialization 
Dependent Variable: (d(d(log(F)))/d(d(𝐹2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(d(log(RAG)))/d(d(𝐹2)) 0.07 16.54 
(d(log((Q)))/d(d(𝐹2))  0.87 33.84 
(d(d(log(Yd/Y)))/d(d(𝐹2)) 283.33 13.77 
R-squared: 0.98         F-Statistic: 949 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.98       D.W. Statistic: 1.89       HT: 0.38      N: 45 
  
In Uganda during the 1975 to 2016 to some extent financialization 
contributed to inflation. During the given period a 1% increase in 
financialization resulted in 0.12% increase in inflation. Meanwhile, a 1% 
rise in household consumption brought about 0.84% increase in inflation, 
ceteris paribus. Thus the influence of financialization on inflation was less 
of a problem when compared to the influence of consumption on inflation. 
 
Table 10. Effect of Financialization on Inflation in Uganda 
Dependent Variable: (d(log(P))/d(Y))/d(d(𝑃2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic  
(d(log(Q))/d(Y))/d(d(𝑃2)) 0.239 10.66 




(d(log(Cn))/d(Y))/d(d(𝑃2)) 0.835 2.91 
R-squared: 0.99         F-Statistic: 1707         Sample Period: 1975-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.99 D.W. Statistic: 2.12       HT: 0.09      N: 41 
  
Deindustrialization is a process caused by reduction or disappearance of 
entire industrial capacity and activities in the country (Rodrik, 2016). 
Deindustrialization translates into financialization. Due to 
deindustrialization the local industries fail to produce the required goods 
and services, thus leading to high demand and huge import bill for 
imports. In the case of Uganda, as given in Table 11, during the 1975 to 
2016 period a 1% increase in import growth resulted to 13% growth in 
financialization per annum on average, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 11. Effects of Quantity of Exchange Rate and Balance of Payments Deficit on 
Financialization  
Dependent Variable: (d(log(F/X))/d(Y))/d(d(𝐹2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(log(Q/X))/d(Y))/d(d(𝐹2)) 1.012 210.08 
(d(log(M/X))/d(Y))d(d(𝐹2)) 13.073 52.32 
R-squared: 0.9998         F-Statistic: 161881 Sample Period: 1975-
2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.9998 D.W. Statistic: 2.17 HT: 0.03      N: 41 
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This present paper finds that financialization depresses physical 
investments. In particular, the paper finds that in Uganda during the 1972 
to 2016 period 1% increase in financialization depressed economic growth 
by 0.75% yearly on average. Similarly, Tori & Onaran (2018) estimate the 
effects of financialization on physical investment in theUK using panel data 
from Worldscope based on balance–sheetsof publicly listed non–
financialcompaniesfor the period 1985–2013. They find robust evidence of 
an adverse effect of financial payments (interests and dividends) as well as 
financial incomes onthe rate of accumulation. Their findings support the 
‚financialization thesis‛ that the increasing orientation of the non–
financialsector towardsfinancial activities ultimately leads to lower 
physical investment, and consequently to stagnant or weak growth. 
 
Table 12. Effect of Financialization on Investment Spending in Uganda 
Dependent Variable: (d(log(I))/d(d(log(X/PO))))/d(d(𝐼2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(d(log(MN))/d(d(log(X/Po))))/d(d(𝐼2)) 1.15 118358 
(d(log(F))/d(log(d(X/Po))))/d(d(𝐼2)) -0.75 -231 
0-squared: 1.00000         F-Statistic: 1.39 × 1010 Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 1.00000 D.W. Statistic: 2.11       HT: 0.0001      N: 45 
  
The liberalization of capital (i.e. deregulation of financial) markets 
increases capital inflows, but mayalso lead to appreciation in exchange 
rates, as witnessed in many developing countries inrecent years, which 
drove down their export demands and increased imports, leading to 
persistent balance of payments deficit (Garcia, 2015; Siddiqui, 2017). In 
Uganda capital inflows has tended to increase the availability of foreign 
exchange rate and gold reserves (RAG) which tended to ease and speed up 
importation more rapidly than the rate of exports, thus leading to the 
sustained balance of payments deterioration. From Table 13 it can be 
verified that a 1% increase in RAG in Uganda during the 1972 to 2016 
period resulted in 0.09% increase on average in the balance of payments 
deterioration. But financialization is over nine times more effective than 
RAG in speeding up the rate of importation for the case of Uganda during 
the sample period. 
 
Table 13. Effects of Exchange Rate and Gold Reserves, and Financialization on Balance of 
payments Deficit 
Dependent Variable: (log(Bd)/d(I))/d(d((M/X)2)) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
(log(RAG)/d(I))/d(d((M/X)2)) 0.09 6019 
(log(F)/d(I))/d(d((M/X)2)) 0.11 99.86 
R-squared: 0.999999         F-Statistic: 615         Sample Period: 1972-2016 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.999999       D.W. Statistic: 2.13       HT: 0.09      N: 45 
 
5. Conclusion 
In Uganda during the 1972 to 2016 period, financialization growth was 
responsible for the decline in economic growth. Financialization seems to 
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have transferred resources from the household sector to the government 
and foreign sectors in Uganda. Similarly, financialization seems to have 
transferred resources from the directly productive sectors to the 
government sector in Uganda during the 1972 to 2016 period. One of the 
root causes of financialization is monetization. Thus the effect of 
monetization on economic growth seems to have been transmitted through 
financialization. That could be the reason why the influence on 
financialization on economic growth was found to be exactly equal to the 
influence of monetization on economic growth in Uganda. The paper 
further finds that deregulation estimated in terms of exchange rate 
depreciation had adverse effects on economic growth in Uganda during the 
1972 to 2016 period.  
Deregulation in terms of exchange rate depreciation was also 
responsible for the monetary expansion in Uganda. Increase in 
financialization gave rise to increase in the amount of foreign exchange rate 
in the domestic market during the 1972 to 2016 period in Uganda. Thus for 
the case of Uganda capital outflows could have resulted in exchange rate 
depreciation during the 1975 to 2016 period. Meanwhile, increase in 
financialization was associated with exchange rate depreciation during the 
sample period. Furthermore, increase in growth of movement in household 
disposable income relative to GDP resulted into unprecedented yearly 
increase in financialization in Uganda during the 1975 to 2016.  
Moreover, in Uganda during the 1975 to 2016 to some extent 
financialization contributed to inflation. Meanwhile, growth in household 
consumption also brought about inflation in the country. But the influence 
of financialization on inflation was less of a problem when compared to the 
influence of consumption on inflation.  
Deindustrialization translates into financialization. Due to 
deindustrialization the local industries fail to produce the required goods 
and services, thus leading to high demand and huge import bill for imports 
of essential goods and services. In the case of Uganda, during the 1975 to 
2016 period increase in import growth caused growth in financialization. 
Furthermore, the paper finds that financialization depressed physical 
investments and consequently constrained economic growth. In Uganda 
capital inflows has tended to increase the availability of foreign exchange 
rate and gold reserves (RAG) which tended to ease and speed up 
importation more rapidly than the rate of exports, thus leading to the 
sustained balance of payments deterioration. Meanwhile, financialization is 
found to have been over nine times more effective than RAG in speeding 
up the rate of importation for the case of Uganda during the sample period. 
Results in the paper suggest the following recommendations: control of 
financialization through macroprudential financial regulation, reduction of 
balance of payments deficit, undertaking more investments in directly 
productive areas and control of the relative movements in disposable 
household consumption relative to GDP. 
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